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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
S'TATE OF UTAH 
POLLY LUND, 
-VPsl.aintiff-Appellant,~ Case No. 8707 
ORIN L. LUND, 
Defendant-Respondent. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF ·THE CASE 
This i.s a case on appeal from a decision of Judge 
Maurice Harding sitting specially on a subsequent, re-
stricted portion of a divorce proceeding, in the District 
Court for Salt Lake County. The appeal involves only 
issues after the entry of an interlocutory decree in favor 
of plaintiff, the subsequent matters pertaining to an 
attempted reconciliation during the pendency of disposi-
tion of motions for a new trial and to amend the earlier 
findings. The parties attempted a reconciliation, but 
the misconduct found by the earlier trial court was re-
sumed making the attempted reconciliation a failure. 
Judge Harding, against the uncontested and undisputed 
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evidence of resumption of the misconduct, found plain~ 
tiff-appellant, by resumption of the marital relation, 
condoned the offenses found in the originail decree, and 
entered a decree estopping appellant from asserting ac-
crued rights, and nulifying the decree of divorce. 
The original divorce decree in favor of plaintiff-
appellant is not before this court on appeal as neither 
party has raised any questions concerning same. The 
court trying that original case entered Findings, Conclu~ 
sions, and a Decree all of which reflected that respond-
ent had been cruel to appellant, and required that he pay 
$175 per month alimony and support money among other 
things. This he failed to do. He filed motions to modify 
Findings, and for a new tria;l, but prior to action on said 
motions, the parties attempted a reconciliation. This 
failed. Defendant-respondent resumed the misconduct, 
and grossly compounded his faults. Judge Larson, who 
had tried the original case, saved any question of condon-
ation in ultimately over-ruling the motions for new trial 
and amendment of findings. It was the question of 
condonation, ·and the right of appellant to receive accrued 
alimony and support money, that was the subject of the 
hearing by Judge Harding on April 3, 1957 which re-
sulted in that judge finding condonation and depriving 
appellant of her divorce and the money judgment. This 
appeal is addressed to the error of Judge Harding in so 
ruling. 
The principle a.spect of this appeal, in relation to 
that ruling, is the fact concerning the resumption of 
respondent's misconduct, the conditions attached by 
·2-
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appellant to the attempted reconciliation, and the break-
ing by the respondent of those conditions. The law on 
the case has been clearly stated by this court in two 
recent case.s of MacDonald v. MacDonald, 120 U. 573, 
236 P. 2d 1066, and Beezley v. Beezley, 296 P. 2d 274. 
It is appellant's contention that the court erred as 
follows: 
1. It failed to make Findings in accordance with 
the uncontested evidence that there was a resumption of 
the misconduct. 
2. It failed to make findings that there were con-
ditions aUached to the reconciliation, on which the evi-
dence was uncontested. 
3. It made a fundamental finding that the reconcili-
ation was without express condition (Tr. 143) which 
wa.s contrary to the evidence. 
4. It failed to apply the law as stated by this court 
in the MacDonald .and Beezley cases. 
5. It deprived appellant of due process of law in 
taking away from her vested rights to receive money and 
property before decreed to her. 
In a supplemental appeal, appellant is perfecting her 
claim to receive: 
1. Temporary alimony and support money pending 
the appeal. 
2. Temporary attorney fe:es and costs, among other 
things, and for contempt against defendant. 
-3-
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STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
This is a summary of the facts and procedures. 
1. An interlocutory decree of divorce was signed 
by Judge Martin Larson on February 10, 1954, (Tr. 12-
24) after he had entered a memorandum decision at page 
10 of Transcript. He found that plaintiff-appellant had 
been and was very ill; that defendant-respondent had 
quarreled, had nagged .at her without just cause; that 
he posse1ssed certain sexual paraphernalia suggesting 
possible infidelity that cau.sed appellant great emotional 
distress ; that he absented himself often at night with no 
explanation; that he did not love her; that his attitude 
toward the marriage was not sound and wholesome, 
that it was dictatorial; that he lacked courtesy and grace 
during her serious illness and gave no cooperation; that 
much of the family fortune had come from appellant's 
hard work, which, becau.se of her illness she could not 
resume; that she had been a good wife; that in his mili-
tary travels respondent did not want appellant to ac-
company him. In his memorandum decision Judge Lar-
son stated "If this attitude .and manner at home was 50% 
of that displayed in court, we may doubt any woman 
could live long with him and maintain her sanity." (Tr. 
10, 13) 
2. The court awarded plaintiff $175 per month 
alimony and support money "such payments to be made 
regardless of any motions for new trial or appellate 
procedures that might be instituted by defendant," (Tr. 
-4-
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22) and in addition ordered him to pay certain bills, and 
keep certain insurance policies in force. ( Tr. 23) Plain-
tiff was awarded the mink after finding that defendant 
had made an absolute gift of them to her in consideration 
of her staying at home during his travels. (Tr. 14) She 
also was awarded the equity in the house, however 
monthly payments of $87.50 were and are required to 
keep the equity alive. ( Tr. 22, 1) 
3. Soon after the Findings and Decree were .signed, 
respondent filed motions for amendment of Findings, 
or a New Trial (Tr. 25) which were not disposed of until 
after the attempted reconciliation had failed. "I will 
state that both sides, so f.ar as counsel are concerned, 
together with the trial court that has handled this matter, 
have worked sincerely to effect a reconciliation of these 
parties." (Tr. 82) It was for this reason that there was 
long delay in the court entering its decree overruling 
respondent's motion for new trial, dated January 15, 
1957. (Tr. 45) 
4. During the interlocutory perrod, and in early 
May 1954 the parties commenced discussion of reconcilia-
tion. It was principally on account of their minor son 
James, about age 8 at the time, that the parties got back 
together. (Tr. 53, 1) 
5. The issue of how they got back together .and 
its consequences were s·aved by Judge Larson for any 
subsequent trial either party desired. (Tr. 45) Respond-
ent-defendant insisted in a pleading at page 41 of the 
-5-
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transcript that the reconciliation amounted to a condon-
ation. Appellant traversed such a claim in a pleading 
at page 43 of the transcript, stating that respondent had 
not acted in good faith in the attempted reconciliation, 
and had among other things, resumed the misconduct be-
fore found by Judge Larson. It was this issue that was 
tried by Judge Harding, and the circumstances of the 
reconciliation were heard. The record before this court 
is principally on that subject. 
Prior to the commencement of the hearing the court 
and counsel discussed procedure and the law at which 
time the court stated in effect that if the parties had lived 
together for more than a year, the law would require him 
to find plaintiff had condoned defendant's misconduct, 
but upon insistance of plaintiff's counsel, the hearing 
was had. Reference is made to the said conference at 
page 11 of plaintiff's brief to the court, (Tr. ____ ) It is 
hence most important to a disposition of this appeal that 
the facts developed at the trial concerning the reconcili-
ation and life together should be understood. 
6. That the attempted reconciliation in May 1954 
was not eagerly sought by either party is apparent; it 
was done out of regard for the child. (Tr. 52) The diffi-
culties before encountered, and found by Judge Larson, 
were thoroughly discus.sed for a long time. The good 
offices of Stake President Harline, were utilized by both 
parties. ( Tr. 55, 108) The charges and countercharges, 
about which the original proceeding was had, were dis-
cussed. These involved the evidences of infidelity upon 
-6-
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which Findings were made, among other things. (Tr. 
79, 109, 13). Those paraphernalia (con drums and leud 
handkerchiefs) which had been upsetting to plaintiff 
were discussed with the stake president, defendant plead-
ing his innocence, plaintiff reporting that, he claimed, "I 
had misjudged him and that he wa.sn 't guilty; he was a 
clean man." (Tr. 79) Plaintiff felt her husband had not 
been honest with her over the past years. It was this sub-
ject of honesty that played a major part in the reconcilia-
tion, and was a condition to resumption of marital rela-
tions. (Tr. 56) 
Defendant's counsel on direct examination of Mrs. 
Lund asked: 
"Q. Were there any promises made by either of 
you about anything that concerned the di-
vorce~ 
A. Y es~that the truth, the whole truth and 
nothing but the truth would be told by both 
of us, completely. In fact I specified that to 
Orin, because that has been one of my com-
plaints with Orin, is that he has not told me 
the truth, and I specified that I wanted the 
truth, the whole truth and nothing but the 
truth about everything, what he did and why 
he was doing it.'' (Tr. 56) 
There were a multitude of things discu,ssed which we will 
only summarize, but the testimony of both parties is 
clear and uncontradicted that Orin, was to improve his 
conduct. They were to "get their house in order," go 
through the temple, have Jimmie sealed to them. De-
fendant himself testified: " ... We went to Harline's 
-7-
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home ... discussed all our differences over money, these 
condrums and the handkerchiefs ... " (Tr. 108) ... "we 
went back together. Everything was to be above board 
and out in the open;" things would be confidential be-
tween them, and everything he had was to be her's, and 
everything she had was to be his. (Tr. 113) 
7. As a result of these discussions, they resumed 
their marital relationship and lived a relaJtively happy 
life for about a year. (Tr. 55) She mistakenly believed 
during this period that he was doing as he promised, and 
thaJt all the money from their efforts was going into a 
joint bank account. However, he had a separate account 
which he did not disclose to her, (Tr. 97) this during the 
time when all was supposed to be going well. The court 
struck Mrs. Lund's statement that the concealment of 
the funds used in Florida violated the agreement of re-
conciliation. His bank statements on this concealed ac-
count were sent to another address; (Tr. 115) and his 
mother, no!t his wife, had the sole power to the funds in 
case of Orin's death. (Tr. 119) Exhibit 38 is his own 
check book showing the dates after reconciliation when 
he made deposits and withdrawals, and it can be ~een 
that he was keeping funds from the joint account, unto 
himself, contrary to the reconciliation agreement. He 
also practiced de·ceit in relations with plaintiff's mother 
regarding the moving of the mink, which upset plaintiff, 
during a time when Judge Harding assumed all was 
going well. (Tr. 101) 
8. Then on Mother's day, 1955 the real break in the 
attempted reconciliation commenced; defendant had re-
-8-
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fused to go to church with his child and wife; he returned 
from being on the property the court had awarded to 
him, was "antagonistic and vicious towards me and said 
he was going to leave me and when he left me he was 
going to leave me absolutely penniless, cut my allowance 
out until I would never know I had a penny." (Tr. 59) 
It is here that the real resumption of the old misconduct 
comes into the open, and it was climaxed four months 
later with brutality. We will scan only the high lights 
of his resumption: 
a. INDIFFERENCE IN HER SICKNESS: Plain-
tiff was ho.spitalized for surgery. Defendant stayed 
away. (Tr. 60) 
b. EYE TROUBLE : She lost the sight of one eye. 
It antagonized him. He reacted as the court had found 
before. (Tr. 61, 14) 
c. DRUNKENESS : He returned from a trip to 
Albuquerque in a drunken condition, completely ex-
hausted, having taken liquor along over her pro,test, (Tr. 
62) this at a time when he was needed in ·the mink opera-
tion. He came home often in drunken condition. (Tr. 64) 
d. INDIFFERENT TO HER: It was none of her 
business where he had been, what he was doing. (Tr. 64, 
65, 66, 67) 
e. SMELLED OF PERFUME: Several Sundays 
he would come home late smelling of perfume he did not 
use. (Tr. 64) 
-9-
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f. ILLEGITIMATE SEX: " ... he said to me 
rather _snottily that I didn't need to think I had anything 
too wonderful, that he knew if he couldn't get it at home 
legitimately, that he could get it illegitimately." (Tr. 66) 
g. ARGUMENTATIVE: "He was argumentative 
and he picked on everything, he was critical; nothing 
pleased him and he just came and went as he pleased. 
S.aid nothing to me, discussed nothing with me, was most 
argumentative, mean, hateful." (Tr. 67) 
h. MYSTERIOUS PHONE CALLS came from 
men and women, late hours, his callers would disguise 
their voices. ('Tr. 67) 
i. GUARD ENCAMPMENT: He attended, taking 
street clothe.s, not needed, remaining away three weeks 
when two weeks only were required, this at a time when 
his help was needed in the mink, and she was too ill to do 
the work. (Tr. 68) 
j. RIFLE TEAM: He returned from the extended 
stay .at Guard Encampment, changed clothes and repre-
S'ented he had to leave again to take a sick man for the 
N,ational Guard to the middle west, and did not stay even 
a night with his sick wife and child. His wife learned 
he had lied to her and had taken the Guard rifle team on 
a junket. When he returned he was in a drunken condi-
tjon. (Tr. 68, 69, 110) 
k. PLAINTIFF'S ATTITUDE: "I wanted to be 
your wife more than anything in this world, and I would 
-10-
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be the happiest girl in the world, but I can't be under 
this cloud of deceit." He didn't say anything. (Tr. 66) 
l. CONCEALED BANK ACCOUNT: It was up-
on his return from the Guard trip drunk, that the con-
cealed check-book fell from his pants, showing that for 
months before he had deposited money and checked on 
it without her knowledge. This she discovered in late 
August or early September 1955, ( Tr. 70) and related 
to money concealed in January of the same year. 
m. PROPHYLACTIC KIT: Among his things at 
the home she found exhibit 39 which counsel for Mr. 
Lund stipulated "are for prevention of venerial disease 
after intercourse if used as directed." (Tr. 76) 
n. PORNOGRAPHIC HANDKERCHIEFS: Ex-
hibit 40 constitutes four such; plaintiff did not want her 
husband filling his mind with such things, nor have them 
about the house. ( (Tr. 78) As counsel e:x:amined the 
exhibit and "definitely" stated there was no objection, 
Mrs. Lund, observing their examination of them in court, 
said: "It makes no difference to him that I find those 
things; he thinks it is just a lort of hooey; there is nothing 
sacred about our marriage, so he makes light of it." (Tr. 
78) It was talk about such things that Orin and Polly 
had with President Harline 16 months before when 
Orin said she had misjudged him, that "he wasn't guilty, 
he was a clean man." (Tr. 79) 
o. LIE ABOUT CONDRUMS: Exhibit 42, the 
cigaret lighter, is relevant in that in the former trial 
condrums had been found in the box; Orin had said in 
-11-
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the reconciliation talk with President Harline the lighter 
itself had been stolen, and that someone had pushed the 
condrum_s, in evidence in the former trial, into the "cover 
around the cigarette lighter and that he was innocent." 
Now, in late August 1955 Mrs. Lund finds the lighter, 
and the former lie became evident. (Tr. 80) It is the 
deceit that is important, not the lighter! 
p. BRUTALITY: The day after Labor Day, 1955 he 
came to her office near the mink operation and demand-
ed: "I want my bank statements." He was admonished 
"I am checking them over and am not through with them; 
they are not your bank statements, they are our bank 
statements." He thereupon struck appellant three times 
with his fist, and kicked her down the basement steps 
with his foot. He blackened the eye of ~Irs. Lund's 
mother, and then ran, son James seeing. He got his 
clothes and left the house, and has not returned. (Tr. 81 
to 86) Plaintiff had to see a doctor and was treated, 
expense involved. 
9. ALIMONY DUE: Plaintiff-appellant proved at 
the time of the said trial delinquent payments ordered to 
be paid her by respondent were unpaid in the sum of $3,-
597.93. (Exhibit -l:G, Tr. 12-l:) This giYes him credit for 
$950.00 paid, and the balance is aliinony and support 
money, excepting the full period when they lived together, 
plus the specific bills Judge Larson ordered hin1 to pay 
of $697.93 which he did not pay. As of April 1, 1957, 
the sum of $3,597.93 was in arrears. Judge Harding 
ignored this entire subject. 
-12-
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10. .A!TTORNEY FEES: Appellant requested the 
court to require respondent to pay her attorney fees. 
(Tr. 126) She stated it had been a long and arduous 
litigation, and she had no funds. At this time defendant 
had filed an appeal of Judge Larson's overruling his 
motion for a new trial. Defendant seems to have now 
abandoned that appeal. Plaintiff's counsel was sworn 
and made a statement of the entire long matters, and 
the difficult trial for which the original court ordered 
defendant to pay $200 as .attorney fees. That is unpaid 
to this day. He further outlined his work, showing sin-
cere attempts to see the reconciliation work, but upon 
it.s failing, more work was involved. He requested, in 
addition to the $200 before awarded, the additional sum 
of $750 as attorneys fees, (Tr. 132) but this was not 
given because the court found condonation had estopped 
both p.arties, and the divorce was annulled. 
At the end of ·the Harding trial, becnuse the court 
had stated it did not regard plaintiff as having any 
rights because of living for more than one year with 
defendant, plaintiff filed an extensive brief exceeding 
forty page·s. As will be seen from the supplemental 
appeal, there have been additional matters for which 
attorney fees are asked. 
11. JUDGE HARDINGS DECISION: On May 13, 
1957 this judge served a memorandum decision holding 
that "plaintiff condoned the misconduct of defendant" 
by the reconciliation, finding : 
-18-
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a. "This reconciliation was without express con-
dition, and the court finds it was not conditional," and 
b. "Any mi_sconduct of the defendant from which 
arose the original grounds for divorce was condoned and 
forgiven by plaintiff." (Tr. 141-143) 
It is from the decree and findings that plaintiff 
now appeals. 
12. TEMPORARY ALIMONY, S U P P 0 R T 
MONEY, AITTORNEY FEES: Pursuant to the Hard-
ing decision, plaintiff sought temporary relief; hearing 
has been had, and from the decision of Judge Aldon 
Anderson, a supplementary appeal is being perfected to 
accompany this major appeal. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED ON 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS 
ON THE UNCONTESTED ISSUE OF RESUMPTION OF 
THE MISCONDUCT. 
POINT II. 
THE OOURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT CON-
DONED THE WRONGS OF RESPONDENT. THE COURT 
IGNORED THE LAW OF UTAH. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE RECONCIL-
IATION WAS NOT ON CONDITION. THERE WERE CON-
DITIONS AND THEY WERE BROKEN. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDG-
MENT FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY, AND FOR 
CONTEMPT. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ASSESS AND 
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES FOR APPELLANT. 
-14-
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO MAKE FINDINGS 
ON THE UNCONTESTED ISSUE OF RESUMPTION OF 
THE MISCONDUCT. 
No where in the disposition of the case did Judge 
Harding make .any reference to resumption of the mis-
conducl before found by Judge Larson. The issue was 
resolved on the simple proposition that if the parties 
reconciled ~and lived together for a year, that ended it, 
that plaintiff had condoned the offen.ses and forgave 
them. The trial court ignored the law as clearly .an-
nounced by this court in 
MAC DONALD v. MAC DONALD, 120 U 573, 
236 P2 1066 
BEEZLEY v. BEEZLEY, 296 P2 274 
It is elementary that the court must make findings 
on essential issues raised in the pleadings and at the 
trial. 
Plaintiff raised the issue by the pleading on page 43 
of transcript, where she alleged, .and proved at the trial, 
that ". . . he resumed the misconduct of which he was 
charged and proven to be guilty in the principal trial." 
This was in response to defendant's pleading on page 
41 of transcript that plaintiff had condoned. But in 
this pleading defendant admitted in his p.aragraph 3 
" ... the parties had further difficulties." At no time in 
the trial of this issue, on which defendant had the burden 
of proof, (Tr. 52) did defendant dispute or argue that he 
-15-
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had not resumed the conduct Judge L,arson had found 
against him. He ignored the entire subject. It was in 
his own case in chief that the resumption facts were 
set irrevocably in the record by his examination of Mrs. 
Lund, his first witness. Mr. Lund failed to dispute any 
of the fundamental facts plaintiff established, and these 
facts must be accepted as true, and the court must make 
findings thereon which establish resumption of the mis-
conduct. To ignore these facts is error. The facts to which 
we make reference are in paragraph 8 of the Statement 
of Facts under the heads from "a" to "p" inclusive. 
At no time did he attempt to dispute, explain or alter 
her testimony concerning: Indifference during her sick-
ness, antagonism during her eye trouble, his drunkeness, 
his perfume aroma and it's implications, his threat of 
illegitimate sex, his argumentative attitude, receipt of 
mysterious and feminine phone calls, three weeks at 
National Guard camp when two only were needed, her 
version of his lie about contraceptive talk with President 
Harline. He left the entire subject of the batteries at 
the end of their resumed life together, exactly as Mrs. 
Lund had laid it in the record, attempting in no way to 
explain or justify his vicious conduct. It is clear that 
his whole case before Judge Harding "-as predicated on 
the erroneous belief that the law was against his wife 
when she went back to him and lived with him for a 
year! 
He did fiercely controvert that he had lied to her 
about taking the sick man to the middle-west, testifying 
that the day he returned from 3 weeks absence, he in-
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sisted it was necessary to fly the rifle team on the 
juncke·t. (Tr. 118) He had absented himself to guard 
camp for the former three weeks, taking dress clothes 
to Camp vVilliams, when mink work had to be done 
at a time when she was too ill to do it and then he 
went again. This court will form it's own opinion as to 
whether he would use the reason of the junket as justi-
fication for leaving again, or plead the urgency of taking 
the sick man to aid. (Tr. 90) The important thing is 
that he cared nothing for his wife and child, for the 
mink bu.siness, and left without sentiment, returning 
drunk! 
He did testify he'd told his wife about the private 
checking account, (Tr. 115) but this was at the time 
of reconciliation. But he there agreed they would keep 
all their ·accounts together and tell her everything. (Tr. 
113, 119) It was 9 months later that he was still making 
secret deposits and withdrawals; and had he died, on 
one of his junkets, appellant would have hurried him 
without aid of that fund; it would have gone in ignorance 
to his mother instead of his wife. (Tr. 119) This was 
not an agreement kept. It was one broken, and a resump-
tion of his misconduct. His attempt at explanation does 
not exculpate him in the least. 
Regarding the prophylatic kit, exhibit 39, found by 
Mrs. Lund just before the battery, he did not address 
himself to the subject except that his counsel stipulated 
what could be accomplished therewith when well used. 
(Tr. 76) His only inference of legitimate possession to 
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said exhibit is on page 108 relating to other implements 
suggesting outside activities. 
With clear findings by the former court, the re-
appearance of worse paraphernalia during a time when 
each was to completely share with each other what they 
had between them (Tr. 113) there is clear, undisputed 
evidence of resumption, a return to misconduct. 
The importance of finding these paraphanalia is 
interestingly discussed by the California court in Arnold 
v. A rno.ld, 17 4 P2d 67 4, a case to which this court made 
reference in deciding Mac Donald, v. Mac Donald, supra. 
In the Arnold case, the court said: 
"At about the same time appellant found in 
his pocket an article that is used in sexual inter-
course which justifiably caused her to assume 
that his adulteries had not ceased. His fatuous 
explanation that he had found the article in a 
box in the basement does not furnish a legitimate 
reason for his carrying it in his pocket." 
It was only natural in the face of respondent stating 
to her that if he could not get what he wanted at home, 
he knew he could get it illegitimately. (Tr. 66) See what 
effect it had on her at the top of p;age 61 of the record. 
And the finding of pornographic handkerchiefs and the 
little man on a cut-out-card his sister described (Tr. 104, 
Ex. 45) forced the honorable Judge Harding to make 
some reference to a resu1nption of the misconduct. But 
the findings are l'lilent! Does forgiveness and attempts 
at reconciliation eo me at such a high price 1 It will make 
bad law to condone such resumption! 
-18-
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Respondent tried to lessen the importance of the 
pornographic hankerchiefs (Ex. 40) by the most inter-
esting testimony that his wife has been told by her 
attorney to lie, not about the existence of the hanker-
chiefs, but alone as to where they were kep't, as if this 
would alter the fact that he had resumed the misconduct! 
(Tr. 107) The testimony of respondent's .sister as to 
how he came by the pornography is relevant as to his 
whole attitude on resumption. (Tr. 102) 
In Angell v. Angell, 191 P2d 54, the California court 
dispo.ses of a very important condonation case, helpful to 
this court, but ignored by the trial court in this case. 
There the trial court ignored, as here, the uncontested 
evidence, and decided that if the p.arties had gone back 
together the court had no discretion to hear or find issues 
of how they came to resume. The learned trial court 
in our case committed the identical error; and in re-
versing, the California high court held: 
"The state is interested in saving the mar-
riage if possible. That purpose would seldom be 
effectual if the innocent p.arty could not dare try 
to effect a reconciliation at the peril of losing the 
right to secure a final decree. It is in the public 
interest for the courts to encourage person.s who 
have secured an interlocutory to become recon-
ciled." 
On the matter of the failure of the trial court to 
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"But where the evidence, and the inferences 
therefrom, are all one way, the trial court has 
no discretion to refuse the relief warranted by 
such evidence. As was said in O'Connell v. Su-
perior Court, 240 P 294, "Where there is a legal 
right to relief under certain facts, and the exist-
ence of such facts is not questioned, a court 
having juri'Sdiction has no discretion to refuse 
the relief." 
It was clear error of the trial court in failing to 
make findings of fact on the uncontested issue of resump-
tion of respondent's misconduct. 
POINT II. 
'THE OOURT ERRED IN FINDING APPELLANT CON-
DONED THE WRONGS OF RESPONDENT. THE COURT 
IGNORED THE LAW OF UTAH. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Utah has re-
cently and clearly laid down the law of condonation in 
Mac Donald vs. McDonald, 120 Ut. 573, 236 P2d 1066 
where Judge Crockett wrote: 
". . . . where the defendant's mi.sconduct is 
resumed, the law permits the injured party to 
assert all of the prior misconduct as well as that 
occuring subsequent to the condonation." 
The Utah court then cited the following powerful 
cases, all in point: 
ARNOLD vs. ARNOLD, 76 Cal. App. 2d, 877 ~ 
174 P2d 674. 
BURT vs. BURT, 48 Wyo. 19; 41 P2d 524. 
THUMB vs. THU~fB, 105 Colo. 352; 98 P2d 279. 
-20-
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In the MacDonald case, decided in 1951 the erring 
party resumed the misconduct, and the court laid down 
the above language which the trial judge failed and 
refused to employ in this ca.se. 
The other and more recent case is Beezley vs. 
Beezley, 296 P2d 27 4 where the court adopted broad, 
widely used language as follows: 
"Our holding here is in accord with 17 Am. 
Jur. 258, sect. 213, REVIVAL OF CONDONED 
OFFENSES: Condonation of the violation of 
the marital duties and obligations is conditioned 
on the future good conduct of the offending 
spouse, and a subsequent offense on his or her 
part revokes or nullifies the condonation and 
revives the original offense as a cause for divorce. 
"In other words, condonation ceases to be 
a defense to a divorce suit where the condoned 
offense is repeated. The general rule i.s that to 
constitute a revival of the condoned offense, the 
offending spouse need not be guilty of the same 
character or degree of offense as that condoned; 
any misconduct is sufficient which indicates that 
the condonation is not accepted in good faith and 
upon the reasonable conditions implied ... " 
We summarize the repetition of offenses. Before 
doing so, may we lay principal emphasis on the fact of 
the brutality practiced at the finale of the former repe-
titions. Respondent admitted the brutality first by plead-
ing at page 41 of the transcript, wherein he stated: 
"'the p.artie.s had farther difficulties." Those difficulties 
were clearly described by Mrs. Lund, and Mr. Lund 
did not cross examine on 'the subject, or testify con-
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cerning it. He left it as she had put it in the record. 
It was inflicted when he asked for "his bank statements," 
and she had said: "I am not through with them but they 
are not your bank statements, they are our bank state-
ments." (Tr. 81) 
"Orin, let's get upstairs and we can talk this 
over, and he said take your hands off of me or 
I will knock you flat, .and he did .... Then he hit 
me right here, (indicating) and knocked me flat 
... Right here by my chin, or the side here ... 
with his fist ... so hard it knocked me right flat 
immediately ... My mother came running and had 
me half way picked up from the back, and that 
is when he hit her ... In the eye ... my mother 
started to pick me up.That is when he hit her .. . 
I carried a bruise on my jaw for some time .. . 
It wa.s out in the open by the basement steps, 
and after he struck my mother, I got up and 
started tussling with him and he knocked me 
down again. I was afraid he was going to go 
after my mother, but he knocked me down again, 
I believe, three times, and I started to run up 
the steps and that is when he turned and kicked 
me down the steps ... \Vith his foot, and it hit 
me right here ... Son Jimmy was at the top 
of the steps . . . He was upset as we were and 
he was shaken up by the fact that Orin had beat 
my mother and I up ... He (Orin) ran out and 
got in his oar and got his clothes and left ... he 
has never been back ... I gathered my mother up 
and went directly to the Memorial ~iedical Clinic 
. . . Doctor . . . treated me and put me under 
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In summarizing the resumption of misconduct before 
the .above batteries, reference is made to the Findings 
of Judge Larson so as to tie up the fact that it was 
resumption, repetition. Note paragraph 8 of the within 
"Statement of Facts." 
Judge Larson found in his Memorandum Decision: 
The record shows an utter lack of affeetion or con-
sideration and no thought of her illness, (a serious and 
probably incurable condition)." (Tr. 10) In his Findings: 
"The defendant has mistreated plaintiff in a cruel in-
human manner over a long period ... has quarreled with 
her without just cause, nagged at her . . . displayed a 
cool, indifferent attitude ... he was in military service. 
Upon return there was found ... some evidence of 
possible infidelity ... exhibition of certain paraphanalia 
suggestive of his possible infidelity ... caused plaintiff 
great emotional and mental distress when coupled with 
his cold and indifferent emotional behavior toward her 
... He has absented himself at night ... without appro-
priate explanation . . . told her he did not love her . . . 
suggested marriage be broken up ... ; defendant had 
filed former suit for divorce ... the .attitude of defendant 
toward this marriage has not been sound and wholesome. 
He has exhibited a snappy, dictatorial attitude ... has 
had a contemptible disposition about having his own 
way ... continually critic.al of plaintiff ... exhibited 
a lack of courtesy and grace due and lack of affectionate 
con.sideration or of civil consideration during her illness 
... he has used the mink operation as an excuse to harass 
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and annoy plaintiff. As a result plaintiff's health has 
been seriously impaired . . . she suffers from either 
multiple sclerosis or Menier's syndrome ... Her recovery 
is not foreseeable ... she lacks equilibrium ... will be 
unable to do hard manual labor ... Considerable of the 
accumulated possessions are the result of her hard work 
and business accumen. Plaintiff has been .a good wife 
to defendant ... has been careful and prudent with the 
money of the family ... The plaintiff's health will not 
stand any further arguing or bickering." (Tr. 13-16) 
In the face of these findings, the present record 
is explicit. To avoid repetition, please refer back to para-
graph 8 of the Statement of Facts. He was indifferent 
to her during her illness after re·sumption when she 
was hospitalized with surgery, was antagonized because 
.she had an eye loss, temperature; he stayed .away on 
trips longer than need be when the mink needed him, 
returning only to go again; and returned time after 
time drunk; his body smelled of strange perfume several 
times ; he flatly told her he could get his sex elsewhere; 
he was argumentative and picked on everything, was 
mean, hateful; received mysterious phone calls and from 
women late at night; he lied to her about his travels 
with the rifle team and about money matters. There 
was the return of the paraphanalia" suggestive of in-
fidelity" in exhibit 39, the vernerial kit, the pornographic 
hankerchiefs, exhibit 40, whieh when coupled "ith his 
thre.at about sex elsewhere, were enough of themselves to 
constitute a finding of resu1nption of cruel conduct. Then 
the lie about the former condrums shown by the cigaret 
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lighter incident further shows his return to marital 
relations was not in good faith. 
Indeed, appellant alleged in an appropriate plead-
ing: "he resumed the misconduct of which he was 
charged and proven to be guilty in the principal trial, 
and for which decree and findings have been entered ... " 
(Tr. 43) And now the proof is evident, undisputed, 
admitted. 
Further reference to the broad legal principles to 
which this court is committed will show Judge Harding 
committed error in failing to find the true facts, and 
apply the law of this court. This court cited three cases 
in the MacDonald decision. The first was Arnold vs. 
Arnold, 17 4 P2d 67 4 where the California court found 
the man had carried "in his pocket an article that is used 
in sexual intercourse which justifiably caused her to 
assume that his adulteries had not ceased." 
The court said : 
"Appellant's condonation of respondent's 
past offenses w.as upon the statutory condition 
that ~he should thereafter be treated with con-
jugal kindness. By reason of the acts of respond-
ent oecuring after the reconciliation, only a brief 
outline of which has been given, the condonation 
effected was revoked ... The revocation of the 
condonation revived the original causes of action 
for divorce, both extreme cruelty and adultry." 
In the case at bar, Mr. Lund resumed, and in defense 
of Mrs. Lund's request for liquidation of moneys accrued 
and due to her, he asserted she had completely forgiven 
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the old offenses and could not utilize the decree of 
divorce given; and the trial court went along. The court 
was in error. The California court said: 
"Since the condonation was revoked and since 
the divorce should have been granted to appellant 
on both grounds charged in her cross complaint, 
cruelty and adultry, everything that had occurred 
both before and after the reconciliation, the long 
continued cruel conduct of respondent and his 
two years of adulterous relations with the cor-
respondent, should have been given weight in 
determining the division of the .community prop-
erty. In view of respondent's unquestioned and 
admitted misconduct the court erred in making 
an equal division. Appellant was entitled to much 
more than one half." 
California has a statute which this court has in effect 
adopted in it's decisions above cited, to the effect that 
"When the condonee commits acts constituting a like 
or other cause of divorce, or when the condonee is 
guilty of great conjugal unkindness, not amounting to a 
cause of divorce but sufficiently habitual and gross to 
show that the conditions of condonation had not been 
accepted in good faith, or not fulfilled" the condonation 
is revoked. 
The .acts of re.spondent in our case, since the at-
tempted reconciliation, are of themselves grounds for 
divorce and in addition, they are revival: the condonee 
is guilty of great conjugal unkindnes.s, and he did not 
accept the conditions with good faith. 
In MacKay v. lJfcl{ay cited by this court supra, the 
Arkansas court, ( 290 SW 951) stated ". . . the right 
-26-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
of condonation lies with the innocent spouse, and not with 
the guilty one." This is a well established doctrine of 
equity, tied in with "he who would have equity should 
do equity." How could our trial court give Mr. Lund the 
full and unqualified equitable defense of condonation 
when he was the guilty party, wholly, and had done no 
equity, and his hands were not clean~ 
Our trial court found that the reconciliation was 
not on condition, but note what the Colorado court said 
in Thumb v. Thumb, 98 P2d 279, the last of the cases 
cited by this court in the MacDonald case : 
"If prior to the separation, the husband had 
condoned the acts of cruelty of which he com-
plained by continuing the marital relationship 
after their occurrence and his knowledge of them, 
or if it be assumed that by entering into the agree-
ment he condoned such acts of cruelty, this in 
and of itself would not be a bar available under 
all circumstances to prevent his bringing an 
action for divorce. CONDONATION IS AL-
WAYS CONDITIONAL. It is conditioned on 
the assumption that there will be no repetition of 
the conduct condoned. Such a repetition voids the 
condonation and makes available as grounds for 
divorce not only the acts committed subsequent 
to the condonation but also those which have been 
condoned.'' 
Why Mr. Lund asserted condonation is apparent: 
He had failed to pay the family bills the court ordered 
him to pay, together with alimony and support money 
for his sick wife and child (Tr. 23) and owed his wife 
$3,597.93 (Ex. 46, Tr. 124, 126) He was in contempt of 
court! He had no other way out and took it, only to have 
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the court go along and estop the appellant from claiming 
her vested rights. But the court erred, and must be re-
versed. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE RECON•CILIA-
TION WAS NOT ON CONDITION. THERE WERE CONDI-
TIONS, AND THEY WERE BROKEN. 
The trial court found .at page 143: "This reconcili-
ation was without express condition, and the court finds 
it to be not conditional." Nothing could be further from 
the truth, both in fact and in law. 
It was respondent's own counsel, not appellant's, 
who developed the conditions : 
"Q. Was there any condition made on your get-
ting back together~ 
A. During the conversation we discussed our 
church activity, and Orin being an Elder and 
my sincere desire was to get the house in 
order and go through the temple . . . have 
Jimmy sealed to us . . . that the truth, the 
whole truth and nothing but the truth would 
be told by both of us, completely. I specified 
that to Orin ... because that has been one of 
my complaints with Orin, he has not told me 
the truth ... about everything, what he did 
and why he wa:s doing it." (Tr. 56) 
The record is full of the circu1nstances on which 
these things were thrashed out with the stake president. 
We will not repeat. But Orin was not truthful either 
before or after the reconciliation. He had lied about the 
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condrums with the president, as shown by Mrs. Lund 
finding the cigaret lighter. (Tr. 79) He lied about his 
private checking account. (Tr. 96, 97, 115-117) While 
he declared he told his wife ,about the money, he may 
have done this prior to the reconciliation; but for him to 
u.se that account after reconciliation, making deposits and 
drawing on same during a time when they had agreed 
everything would be in common between them, was not 
honest. He would never have told his wife that his 
mother, not his wife, would have the balance if he died! 
This was a fraud, and it broke the condition. 
In the face of the doctrine of Thumb v. Thumb, 
supra, that "Condonation is always conditional,'' .and 
this as a matter of law, how can the decision of Judge 
Harding stand? It can't, he was in error. 
The importance of conditions is well tried out and 
explained in the following California cases, all of which 
were before the trial court by brief, before he made his 
error: 
Angel v. Angel, 191 P. 2d 54; 
Hellbush v. Hellbush, 290 P. 18; 
Lane v. Superior Court, 285 P. 860; 
Butterfield v. Butterfield, 34 P. 2 145; 
Olson v. Superior Court, 165 P. 706, 1 ALR 
1589; 
Slusher v. Slusher, 193 P. 2d 778. 
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In .Angel v . .Angel, supra, the supreme court said: 
"Whether an agreement is an unconditional 
one of forgiveness .and therefore justifies the 
denial of the final decree or a conditional one, and 
therefore warrants the granting of the final de-
cr.ee, is a question of fact. If the evidence or the 
reasonable inferences therefrom, is conflicting, 
the determination of the question by the trial 
court, in accordance with elementary principles, 
is conclusive on the appellate court." (page 57) 
There is no conflict in the evidence. The conditions ex-
acted by appellant were never contradicted. Respondent 
virtually adopted her statement of the circumstances, 
except for irrelevant matters. (Tr. 109) They agreed 
to h.ave things confidential, "everything that you had 
w~s to be her's and everything she had was to be yours? 
That is true." (Tr. 113) Certainly there were reason-
able conditions. There could not help but be. Note Mr. 
Lund admits at page 113 of his testimony the entire 
subject of the "handkerchiefs and the contraceptives 
w.as discussed with Polly . . . and with President Har-
line." This meant his conduct. We will not further labor 
it. 
Bajakian v. Bajakian, 57 R.I. 470, 109 ALR 
1001 et sec. 
The Angell case, supra, embraces the following pert 
language, decisive of the issue : 
"The resumption of marital relations was 
based on the express agreement of the parties that 
the reconciliation should be conditional. There is 
not one word of evidence to the contrarY. and de-
fendant does not contend that there is. Defendant 
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contents himself with the mere assertion that 
where parties resume marita:l relations whether 
the final decree shall be granted rests in the dis-
cretion of the trial court. But that does not mean 
at the whim or c,aprice of the trial court. It means 
a legal discretion guided by law. When the law 
is clear the only discretion is to follow the law. 
"There being no evidence and no inference 
from the evidence to support the implied finding 
that the forgiveness here involved was uncondi-
tional, and the uncontr.adicted evidence showing 
that the forgiveness was conditional, we are of 
the opinion that the action of the trial court in 
refusing to grant the final decree was .an abuse of 
discretion. The order appealed from is reversed." 
Our trial court refused to apply the law in a clear case 
where there were reasonable conditions, in the face of 
which he found there were no conditions. 
The Utah Supreme Court has not labored the ques-
tion of conditions. It is on the sound ground simply 
of resumption of the misconduct. It has followed the 
Colorado court in Thumb v. Thumb, supra, where "Con-
donation is always conditional." But if this court desires 
to examine this record on the cited California cases of 
condition the record wiH support appellant on that 
ground too. The trial court was clearly in error. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ENTER JUDG-
MENT FOR ALIMONY AND SUPPORT MONEY, AND FOR 
CONTEMPT. 
The trial court had before it an "Order To Show 
Cause" why respondent should not be required to pay 
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appellant the sum of $2400 as accrued alimony and 
support money. (Tr. 38) Brought down to the date of 
the trial, the money owed by respondent was $3,597 .92. 
(Tr. 48) and proof was made before Judge Harding 
thereof. 
These moneys accrued pursuant to Judge Larson's 
Decree wherein he had found: "Plaintiff is presently 
without funds, she having sufficiently exhausted the 
cash resources at her disposal as to make it necessary at 
once for defendant to begin the alimony and support 
money payments, regardless of any appellate procedure 
that might be instituted by the defendant." (Tr. 15) In 
addition, there was mandate for him to pay certain ac-
crued bills. ( Tr. 23) The alimony and support money 
was to be paid at $175 per month, plus $200 attorney 
fees. 
The above liquidated sum of $3,597.92 does not in-
clude any accrual for moneys during the attempted re-
conciliation. It includes accrual of $225 before the at-
tempted reconciliation, $697.93 for payments to doctors, 
groceries, and the balance is for payments not made 
after he committed the battery in September 1955 and 
abandoned his wife and child. During the entire period, 
he paid $950 at the r.ate of less than $50 per month, sole-
ly for his son James, when the court had specified he pay 
$75 .support money, and $100 as alimony. See Ex. -16, 
and transcript p. 124. 
In failing to pay these amounts, he was carrying 
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out his threat to appellant wherein he s.aid, and he did 
not ever dispute or answer this testimony: 
". . . he said he was going to leave me and 
when he left me that he was going to leave me 
absolutely penniless, cut my allowance out until 
I would never know I had a penny." (Tr. 59) 
He did, and is doing, just that! And she is .a sick woman, 
with a "serious and probably incurable condition." (Tr. 
10, 58) 
The trial court in finding condonation, estopped 
appellant from asserting rights to said $3,597.93 and de-
clared she was in effect still married to respondent, not-
withstanding he was doing nothing for her. She w.as 
awarded the house on Millcreek Way (Tr. 15) but there 
was a "balance due on said home of between $9000 and 
$10,000." (Tr. 12) She has had to protect this equity 
and she has. If respondent prevails in his position, 
her sacrifice in borrowing to meet these monthly pay-
ments will h.ave enured to him. 
The trial court found that respondent had made an 
absolute gift of the mink to her as a condition of her 
remaining at home during his military travels. (Tr. 14) 
She has had to feed those mink, during a time when she 
was getting no help from him. 
Appellant got the insurance policies long before 
taken out, but nothing to pay the premiums except her 
alimony. That is part of why the court ordered the pay-
ment of the alimony and support money regardless of 
appellate procedures. (Tr. 23) And in the supplemental 
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brief, it will be shown how she has had to go into debt 
to keep up the house payments, feed the mink, herself, 
his child, and pay the in.surances. 
Did the orders to pay these sums accrue~ Are they 
a vested right in appellant~ Should she be awarded these 
sums~ The answer is "yes,'' and there are two bases for 
argument: 
A. If respondent wanted to stay the accrual of 
these obligations, during the time his motion for new 
trial was being considered, he should have filed a super-
sedeas bond under the rules applicable, but he did not. 
The order to pay may be regarded as temporary alimony. 
The statute 30-3-3 UCA gives the court power to enter 
the orders it did. Under Rules 58A, 59, 62 a, b, d, and h, 
the rights of the parties to deal with the order to pay 
money are stated, and Rule 54 b is also apposite. Re-
spondent has done nothing to stay the accrual of appel-
lants rights, .and they have vested. 
B. The vesting of rights to receive accrued alimony 
and support money is clearly stated by the court in 
Openshaw v. Openshaw, 144 P. 2d 528 stating: " ... the 
right to collect such in.stallments becomes vested upon 
their due date." It will be argued that by the reconcilia-
tion appellant divested herself. At the least, she did not 
divest herself of that which had accrued prior to the 
attempt to reconcile, in the sum of $:.2:25. (Ex. 46) But 
the court even ignored this small sum. 
If appellant divested herself of vested rights by 
condonation, then the bills are .all respondent's as his 
..S4-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
wife. But this argument is specious, worthless. These 
parties are obviously at the end of everything. The 
marriage is a "wreck," and in the language of MacDonald 
v. MacDonald, supra, this court must "pronounce a bene-
diction on the wreck" and in justice and equity, use the 
best mean.s of "arrangement of the property and income 
of the parties" and this is to find respondent resumed 
his misconduct, restore appellant to her decree, and re-
quire respondent to do what Judge Larson told him to do. 
And punish him for contempt! 
In considering the decision of the trial court, this 
court will be bound to utilize its own criteria as stated 
in Wilson v. Wilson, 296 Pd 977, and will give attention 
to : " ... the age of the parties; ... their health; consid-
erations relative to children; the money and property 
they possess and how it was acquired," etc. Note in the 
original Findings of F.act, Judge Larson stated appel-
lant was very important in acquiring the family posses-
sions. (Tr. 121) The fact that she is ill, probably incur-
able (Tr. 10), and has the child of the parties, should 
leave no doubt in this court's mind, in the face of his 
earnings and good health. ( Tr. 13) She h.ad done hard 
physical labor of which she is no longer capable. This 
court has many times admonished trial courts to take 
these things into account. And his making over $400 a 
month and sending less than $50 to cover the enormous 
burdens of appell.ant is unworthy. (Tr. 124) It is con-
temptuous. Reference is here made to the supplementary 
appeal and brief to follow, to show his continued attitude 
of leaving this woman penniless. 
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This case is just the opposite of Larsen v. Larsen, 
300 P2 596, where this court excused the payment of 
accrued alimony. In the case at bar, respondent knew 
the family obligations, knew his wife's inability to meet 
them alone, and the court had specifically ordered him to 
pay, carving out any exception for appellate procedures. 
(Tr. 22) This of itself makes the obligation in the nature 
of temporary support, when respondent contemplated a 
new trial. And when he left his sick and brutally beaten 
wife and child as he did, knowing these thing.s, he ought 
to have no defense or excuse, particularly when appel-
lant makes no claim for help during the time they tried 
to make a go of it. 
It was the child that brought the attempted recon-
ciliation and what appellant did must not prejudice that 
child. The mother could not cut off the right of the child 
for support. Price v. Price, 289 P2d 1044, Utah. And 
it is apparent that the best interests of the child are that 
he and his mother have the money the court earlier de-
creed should be paid. 
It will produce sound results in broad public policy 
for this court to find respondent broke the condonation; 
that he must pay the bills. For this court to affinn the 
Harding decision is a warning against attempts at re-
conciliation, and this is contrary both to general public 
policy, and to the new statute recently enacted. Our law 
now reads: 
"It is the declared public policy of the State 
to maintain desirable marital and family rela-
tionships, and to take reasonable 1neasures to pre-
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serve marriages, particularly where minor chil-
dren are involved .... " (30-3-11, 1957 pocket sup~ 
plement, 1957 session.) 
" ... no hearing for decree of divorce shall be 
held by the court until 90 days shall have elapsed 
from the filing of the complaint .... " (30-3-18 
ibid.) 
This means the law of Utah is designed to encourage 
by all possible means the preservation of the marriage. 
When the complaint is filed, does this mean the parties 
are to remain ap,art absolutely for the 90 days, in peril 
of condonation~ Of course it does not. The doctrines of 
this court in the MacDonald and Beezley cases, supra, 
take care; and if the attempted re.sumption is interfered 
with by a resumption of the wrong named in the com-
plaint, this court will not throw that plaintiff out. And 
in the instant case, the parties and the public should be 
encouraged to try just what the litigants at bar tried. 
If the offending party resumes his misconduct, the inno-
cent should not suffer. Again see Price v. Price, supra, 
and Angel v. Angel, 191 P2 54, the California case 
quoted, supra. 
See the strong policy of the 1957 legislature for 
enforcing accrued alimony when the innocent party is 
on relief (30-3-22, 1957 session laws., pocket edition). 
And when Mrs. Lund fortunately avoids the relief rolls, 
she ought not to be penalized. 
This court should enter judgment for the sum of 
$3,597.93 as of April 1, 1957 and send the case back for 
-37-
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
the ,sole purpose of liquidating the intervening balance, 
plus attorney fees and to punish respondent. 
POINT V. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO ASSESS AND 
AWARD ATTORNEY FEES FOR APPELLANT. 
Appellant's counsel took the stand and testified as 
to the arduous nature of this bitterly contested case, ask-
ing the court to take judicial notice of what is on file. 
All parties worked for the I econciliation, including ap-
pellant's. ( Tr. 131) but it miserably failed because of 
the contemptuous conduct of respondent. 
Appellant was awarded $200 .attorney fees for the 
original action which has never been paid. (Tr. 132) 
Three years of work has subsequently gone into the case 
that ultimately came before Judge Harding, for which 
appellant asked the court to award $750 additional at-
torney fees but he ignored the subject. (Tr. 127) As an 
example of the earnestness with which appellant's coun-
sel has worked in the case, reference is made to the brief 
filed with Judge Harding so that he could see the full 
fact and law situation. But that has been ignored. (Tr. 
See Supplemental Brief.) 
We submit to this court the matter of fees, asking 
that the attitudes of the respective parties be taken into 
account. In the face of the contemptuous conduct of 
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respondent manifested throughout the proceedings, there 
was and is nothing for ·counsel to do but continue the 
fight for justice and equity. The ethics of the bar require 
nothing less. 
In setting attorney fees, the court is requested to 
take note of the following: 
1. The Affidavit, and Order to Show Cause, soon 
after the infliction of the battery, filed October 13, 1955, 
was not heard, due to negotiations. 
2. After the battery and respondent's complete 
abandonment of appellant, it became apparent the long 
matter must be brought to an end, and this is manifest 
by Notice Calling up Motions, (Tr. 33) which resulted 
in the issue of condonation being framed by pleadings, 
(Tr. 35, 41, 43). Appellant's Petition and the court's 
Order. to Show Cause, ('Tr. 37, 38) finally came before 
Judge Larson, together with all other matters, and it is 
clear they were complicated, on December 22, 1956. The 
preamble to the decree of that judge recites the great 
work that had gone into the case both by coun;sel and 
the court, looking for an amicable settlement; but it's 
utter failure after bona fide attempts numerous times 
drove Judge Larson to wash his hands of the case. Obvi-
ously he did not do this for. light cause; but appellant's 
counsel has had to go on. The proof of his arduous 
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labors is evident in this decree. ( Tr. 45) It was there 
that condonation was saved for the trial that was later 
had. The supplemental pleadings necessary to bring all 
matters pending before the court, including accrued .ali-
mony, etc., were all before the court; but when the trial 
judge heard the ease, he was not interested in anything 
but condonation. 
The attitude.s of the litigants is clearly stated at page 
122 of the record respecting difficulties to get financial 
help to appellant. Respondent has balked every inch of 
the way in paying the bills he contracted for the house, 
insurance, etc. He has left them to his wife, who has had 
to fight the difficult battle alone, and the equities in all 
these things have been maintained only by her borrow-
ing and s·cant living. Respondent's attitude has been to 
defeat the divorce, by condonation, so that Mrs. Lund, 
under his theory has been his wife all along; but he has 
failed to assume a manly, decent respect for his obliga-
tions, whether .as husband, or as divorcee. It has been 
necessary that appellant's attorney pe~sue the matter 
diligently, and she says that he has. (Tr. 126) 
STUBER v STUBER, 244 P2d 650, Utah 
It is only just that this court assess the fees in the 
amount conservatively reque.sted, that of $750 since the 
original decree, .and to this part of the case. 
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CONCLUSION 
Finally, appellant asks this court to find that the 
divorce decree entered February 10, 1954 is valid; that 
she has not condoned the faults of respondent; that he 
resumed his misconduct, reinstating the old decree; that 
she have judgment for all alimony and support money 
down to date, except the time they attempted to reconcile ; 
that he be required to pay the bills Judge Lar,son ordered 
him to pay; that he be adjudged in serious contempt; 
that he be required to pay attorney fees, and that the 
matters between them be given finality. 
July 1957 
Respectfully submitted, 
WARWICK C. LAMOREAUX, 
Attorney for AppeUant 
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